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Separation Anxiety:  The Implications 
of Rhode Island’s Reluctance to 
Remove Fault from Divorce 
Proceedings 
Meghan L. Kruger* 
Between 1970 and 1985, the United States experienced an 
overhaul in divorce legislation.1  During that time, nearly every 
state either replaced or supplemented its fault-based system with 
some form of no-fault divorce, which was indicative of the 
country’s “widespread dissatisfaction” with the outdated notion 
that a party must prove fault in order to be granted a divorce.2  
Rhode Island was no exception to the trend and followed suit in 
1975, adding “irreconcilable differences” as a ground for obtaining 
an absolute divorce in addition to its already existing fault-based 
grounds.3  This new ground was explicitly recognized by Rhode 
Island courts as “remov[ing] the fault factor from a divorce 
proceeding and abolish[ing] the necessity of presenting what may 
be the distasteful details of personal conduct by either party.”4 
*  Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 
2015; B.A., University of Connecticut, 2010.  Many thanks to the Editorial 
Board, especially Caitlyn Kelly, for their feedback while drafting this 
comment.  The title is courtesy of Tom Pagliarini.  I am deeply indebted to 
my friends and family for the support they have provided me throughout my 
academic career and beyond.  Above all, my deepest gratitude to my parents 
for their unwavering love and guidance over the years.  
 1.  See Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 
1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 79 (1991).   
 2.  See id.   
 3.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006); Hamel v. Hamel, 426 
A.2d 259, 261 (R.I. 1981) (citation omitted). 
 4.  Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261 (citation omitted).   
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However, in Rhode Island, no-fault divorce is an illusion.  
While, in theory, a marriage can be dissolved without a showing of 
fault, fault is still statutorily preserved as a factor for 
consideration in several of the most important, and most litigated, 
determinations arising from a divorce: the division of marital 
assets, awarding alimony and the determination of child custody.5  
It is in these latter portions of the divorce proceeding that either 
or both parties can provide evidence of fault of the other in an 
effort to get a “bigger slice of the pie.”6 
Section 15-5-3.1 of the Rhode Island General Laws states that 
“[a] divorce from the bonds of matrimony shall be decreed, 
irrespective of the fault of either party, on the ground of 
irreconcilable differences which have caused the irremediable 
breakdown of the marriage” and provides that “allegations or 
evidence of specific acts of misconduct shall be improper and 
inadmissible.”7  Nevertheless, and quite curiously, the statute 
goes on to list determinations “pursuant to §§ 15-5-16 [alimony 
and counsel fees] and 15-5-16.1 [assignment of property]” as well 
as child custody, as exceptions to the no-fault rule.8  Besides being 
blatantly contradictory on its face—making evidence of fault 
“improper and inadmissible” on the one hand, yet permitting it to 
aid in determining the most important concerns stemming from a 
divorce on the other—this construction undermines the 
underlying goals of the no-fault system and undercuts the reasons 
why most states shifted to no-fault divorce in the first place.  The 
shift to a no-fault system was, among other things, largely 
 5.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013); Mattera v. 
Mattera, 669 A.2d 538, 541 (R.I. 1996) (holding that a trial judge did not 
abuse his discretion in considering that the wife was “a ‘good and faithful 
wife’ whose marital conduct was impeccable [while the husband’s] marital 
conduct included the abuse of alcohol and ‘a bigamous relationship with 
another female during the course of the within divorce proceedings.’”); Tarro 
v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 561 (R.I. 1984) (noting that “‘[c]onduct’ [within the 
context of section 15-5-16] is not limited to bad conduct or marital fault but 
also encompasses good conduct during the term of the marriage”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Giammarco v. Giammarco, 959 A.2d 531, 534 (R.I. 2008) 
(affirming a magistrate’s award of 65% of the marital state to the plaintiff 
where, in addition to presenting other inferior qualities, the defendant was 
“totally at fault in the breakdown of the marriage”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 7.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1. 
 8.  Id.  
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thought to dignify the divorce process by reducing hostility 
between parties, increasing personal dignity, cultivating respect 
for the law, and respecting the inherent privacy that society 
believes exists between married couples.9  By preserving a 
consideration of fault, especially pertaining to the most important 
aspects of a divorce proceeding, one can easily see how these goals 
would be seriously undermined.  It is almost as if the statute was 
paying lip service to the no-fault movement, conveying its loyalty, 
though quite insincerely. 
A survey of Rhode Island case law demonstrates how 
pervasive fault actually is in this supposed no-fault system.10  
Since courts are bound by the “clear and unambiguous” language 
of the statute and because of the undoubtedly clear and 
unambiguous language in section 15-5-3.1, Rhode Island courts 
have in effect been forced to explicitly consider fault.11  Thus, 
their opinions are replete with evidence of less than stellar 
conduct by one or both of the divorcing parties—despite the fact 
that this is just the type of thing no-fault divorce sought to 
eliminate. 
This comment focuses on a troubling inconsistency in Rhode 
Island divorce law: namely, how a divorce can be obtained 
“irrespective of the fault of either party,” with “allegations or 
evidence of specific acts of misconduct” considered to be 
“improper” pursuant to section 15-5-3.1, yet fault can explicitly be 
considered when dividing marital property consistent with section 
15-5-16.1.12  It first provides a brief history of divorce in the 
United States and outlines how and why the move from a fault-
based system to a largely no-fault regime occurred.  Next, it 
discusses how moving to a no-fault system requires re-evaluating 
 9.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 79, 96. 
 10.  See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160, 1162 (R.I. 1994) 
(holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in awarding the wife 
65% of assets where she suffered emotional and physical abuse during the 
marriage, even though she was not faultless in its eventual breakdown); 
Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 564 (R.I. 1984) (concluding that equitable 
division of marital property was proper where both parties were at fault). 
 11.  See Ruffel v. Ruffel, 900 A.2d 1178, 1192 (R.I. 2006).  
 12.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1 
(West 2006).  This paper does not address considering fault when 
determining alimony, which is now largely used only as a rehabilitative 
measure pursuant to section 15-5-16 or child custody because of the 
extraordinary concerns pertaining to the well-being of children.   
                                                                                                                                  
KRUGERFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/20/2014  2:02 PM 
2014] REMOVING FAULT FROM DIVORCE 811 
how marital property is divided, how Rhode Island considers fault 
in both the granting of divorces and dividing marital property, and 
why this is problematic.  Finally, it discusses how the goals of the 
no-fault divorce system would be better served by implementing 
an equal, or at the very least, equitable division of assets, 
irrespective of fault. 
I.   A BRIEF HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
Under English law, no common law right to a divorce existed: 
an unhappy couple could seek “only a limited right to a legal 
separation from the ecclesiastical court,” “a court having 
jurisdiction over matters concerning the Church of England.”13  In 
the years leading up to the Revolution, most colonists remained 
largely subject to the laws of England, which permitted divorce 
only by an act of Parliament.14  Following the Revolution, the 
American states drifted away from the strict requirements of 
England and started passing their own divorce laws.15 
Early divorce laws differed dramatically by region.  New 
England enacted liberal divorce laws quickly, allowing divorce on 
a number of grounds, while the Southern states granted divorce 
only under the strictest requirements, if at all.16  Mid-Atlantic 
States passed intermediate divorce laws between these two 
extremes, allowing for legal divorces, but only on limited grounds, 
such as New York’s 1787 law that only permitted divorce for 
adultery.17 
Influenced largely by the principles advanced by the 
Protestant Reformation, wherein the doctrines and structure of 
the Roman Catholic Church18 were rejected in favor of a less 
 13.  1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013); 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 407 (9th ed. 2009).   
 14.  See Michael M. O’Hear, “Some of the Most Embarrassing Questions”: 
Extratterritorial Divorces and the Problem of Jurisdiction Before Pennoyer, 
104 YALE L.J. 1507, 1511 (1995). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id.  South Carolina, for example, did not grant divorces.  Id. 
 17.  Id.   
 18.  By the ninth century, the Roman Catholic Church had largely gained 
exclusive control over matrimonial issues throughout Europe. See Shaakirrah 
R. Sanders, The Cyclical Nature of Divorce in the Western Legal Tradition, 50 
LOY. L. REV. 407, 412 (2004).  The Church’s view on marriage can be stated 
quite simply – “a valid celebrated Christian marriage was dissoluble only by 
the death of one of the spouses.” Id. at 413 (internal quotation marks 
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stringent Protestant church,19 the founders of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony were the first to advance the idea of a right to an 
absolute divorce in the United States.20  In the absence of 
religious courts in the New World, the task of determining marital 
status, by default, fell to the government.21 Thus, the 
Massachusetts General Court established the Court of Assistants 
in 1636, whose jurisdiction included “all Causes of divorce.”22 
Thereafter, in 1674, the Court of Assistants first approved a 
petition brought by a woman seeking “legal divorcement from hir 
[sic] husband” because he was “married to another woman in 
London;” however, it is unclear as to whether, based on the timing 
of the peripheral marriage, the declaration actually sought a 
nullity of the marriage versus a divorce.23  Regardless, others 
followed suit, seeking a right to divorce for reasons such as 
adultery and desertion.24 Following Pennsylvania, in 1786, 
Massachusetts was the second state to officially pass divorce 
legislation.25 
The Massachusetts Court of Assistants also recognized an 
early version of dividing marital assets between a separating 
husband and wife.  Shortly before the American Revolution, 
Abigail Fuller, in divorcing her husband, sought the exclusive 
right to use her own estate and sought support of herself and her 
child.26  She was granted the estate and was awarded spousal and 
child support “in the amount of 25 pounds of sterling a year.”27  It 
omitted).  Some alternative remedies existed to dissolve a marriage, such as 
annulment, a non-consummated marriage, or a grant of separation, however 
these were rarely utilized.  Id. at 413–14. 
 19.  See id. at 415 (“[F]rom the sixteenth century onward the 
acceptability of divorce underwent a renaissance as . . . Protestant Reformers 
denied . . . that marriage was a holy sacrament, as endorsed by the Roman 
Catholic Church, and advocated the possibility of divorce under certain 
circumstances.”). 
 20.  1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013). 
Divorce still remained largely unheard of in the Mid-Atlantic and Southern 
colonies at this time because of the more pervasive influence of the Church of 
England on these regions than in New England.  Id.   
 21.  Id.   
 22.  Id. § 1:5 n.5. (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 23.  Id. § 1:5 (internal quotation marks omitted); Id. § 1:5 n.5. 
 24.  See id. § 1:5. 
 25.  O’Hear, supra note 14, at 1511.   
 26.  1 MASS. PRACTICE Family Law and Practice § 1:5 (4th ed. 2013).  
 27.  Id.  
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is from these origins that divorce law was created and, ever so 
slowly, began to evolve. 
A.   Fault-based Divorce 
Early divorce law centered on the notion that marriage was 
“an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public 
is deeply interested.”28  The idea of requiring fault by at least one 
party to a divorce presumably grew out of a desire to preserve the 
“institution” of marriage.29  Traditionally, only an innocent party 
could petition for a divorce, and divorce laws required that such a 
party prove his or her significant other committed one of any of 
the statutorily enumerated offenses constituting fault.30  Though 
they varied from state to state, adultery, cruelty, and desertion 
were among the most common fault grounds.31 
Several defenses arose in response to fault-based divorce, 
including a “clean hands” type defense, wherein if both parties 
were at fault, then neither could obtain a divorce.32  Other 
defenses included connivance, which required a showing that the 
innocent spouse consented to the alleged offense, and condonation, 
wherein the innocent spouse forgave the marital indiscretion such 
that the indiscretion was then “nullified.”33  In an effort to get 
around the fault requirement, some couples seeking a divorce even 
went so far as to engage in collusion by “alleging false evidence of 
a marital offense.”34  Collusion, forum shopping (to find the most 
favorable divorce laws), and marriage recognition issues amongst 
the states were early indicators of a defective fault-based system 
and a need for a more uniform approach.35 
A number of social, economic, and cultural changes beginning 
in the early twentieth century contributed to creating an 
environment ripe for divorce reform to surface in the United 
 28.  Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).   
 29.  See Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Fault: A Viable Means of Re-Injecting 
Responsibility in Marital Relations, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 605, 609 (1996) 
 30.  Laura Bradford, the Counterrevolution: A Critique of Recent 
Proposals to Reform No-Fault Divorce Laws, 49 STAN. L. REV. 607, 610 (1997). 
 31.  Id. Other types of fault included “conviction of certain crimes, 
homosexuality, insanity, and drug addiction.”  Id.   
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Morse, supra note 29, at 611–12. 
 34.  Id. at 612. 
 35.  O’Hear, supra note 14, at 1511–12. 
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States. Herbert Jacob, a political science professor at 
Northwestern University and author of Silent Revolution: The 
Transformation of Divorce Law in the United States, suggests a 
number of factors that may have contributed to a shift in attitude 
towards divorce:  an increased life expectancy amongst women 
(presumably due in part to a consistent decrease in mortality 
during childbirth), increased participation by women in the labor 
force (thus making them less financially dependent on their 
husbands), and the effects of the feminist movement beginning in 
the 1960s, to name a few.36 Additionally, the 1980s saw a 
downturn in “child centered” marriages, with more married 
couples waiting to have children, or deciding against doing so 
altogether.37  Jacob notes: 
These social and economic changes altered the context of 
married life in the United States.  The marriage vow, 
‘until death do us part,’ had new meaning when life 
extended almost twice as long in the 1980s as in the 
1900s.  The long period without children and the financial 
contribution of women modified relationships between 
wives and husbands. Husbands could no longer 
automatically claim autocratic dominance and wives 
more often sought a greater degree of equality.  Most 
significantly, however, the focus of marriages shifted from 
children and economics to companionship.38 
These significant changes in the social attitude toward 
marriage provided an open invitation for legislative reform of 
divorce laws. 
II.  THE MOVEMENT TO NO-FAULT DIVORCE 
Early efforts to reform divorce law had mixed results, with 
 36.  See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 16–24 (1998). 
 37.  Id. at 25.  Jacob suggests that the invention of contraception, along 
with the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade, in 1973, legalizing 
abortion, made it “possible to separate sexual activity from the probability of 
procreation,” thus resulting in more childless marriages, and contributing to 
an attitude that marriage was no longer “the only acceptable context for 
sexual activity.”  Id.  
 38.  Id. at 27–28.   
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New York making the first serious attempt at reform in, 1966.39  
However, because New York had the strictest divorce laws in the 
country at the time—originally enacted in 1787 and permitting 
divorce only on the grounds of adultery—the reform sought was 
nothing groundbreaking; rather, people believed it did “no more 
than bring the state’s law into the twentieth century.”40  Other 
states also made minor attempts at reform, such as offering, or 
sometimes requiring, “conciliation procedures” before a final 
divorce was granted.41  This approach appears to be an attempt to 
balance a right to a divorce with an interest in ensuring divorces 
were only granted to couples who had exhausted all reconciliatory 
options.42 
The appropriate context for reform proved crucial to make any 
serious headway in divorce reform, and California, with its 
seemingly laidback lifestyle, superficial values, and reputation “as 
an incubator for novel social ideas” was just the place.43  In 1969, 
California became the first state to adopt a purely “no-fault” 
divorce approach by passing the Family Law Act of 1969 (“the 
Act”), which became effective the following year.44  The legislation 
was enacted as a proposed solution to the rising divorce rate and 
to promote family stability, which was coupled with the 
implementation of a state family court system.45  The Governor’s 
Commission, who was tasked with studying and proposing 
changes to divorce and family law, and ultimately set forth the 
Act, which “urged the abandonment of all fault grounds,” partially 
based on the belief that fault grounds promoted “undue stigma” 
and “antagonism” between married couples.46  The Act eliminated 
 39.  Id. at 30.  The 1966 revision added additional grounds for divorce 
including “abandonment, imprisonment of a spouse in excess of three years, 
cruel and inhuman treatment, and living separately and apart from one’s 
spouse for a period, originally, of two or more years pursuant to a separation 
agreement.”  Meaghan E. Howard, Modern Reformation: An Overview of New 
York’s Domestic Relations Law Overhaul, 29 TOURO L. REV. 389, 391 (2013).  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 31.   
 42.  See id. 
 43.  Id. at 43.   
 44.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 83. 
 45.  Id. at 83–84.  
 46.  J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce 
Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559, 583 (2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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all previous fault grounds for divorce, and allowed for “dissolution 
of marriage” only upon the ground of “irreconcilable differences 
which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage” 
or “incurable insanity.”47  Evidence of marital misconduct was not 
only unnecessary following the Act, it was inadmissible.48  
Interestingly, the Act was signed into law by then-Governor 
Ronald Reagan, who later said it was “one of the biggest mistakes 
of his political life.”49 
Around the same time as the passage of the Act, the highly 
regarded National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (“NCCUSL”)50 voted to propose the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act (“UMDA”), under which the sole grounds for divorce 
was to be a no-fault ground.51  Further, the UMDA proposed that 
“property division, spousal maintenance, and child support 
decisions were to be made ‘without regard to marital 
misconduct.”52  Although the American Bar Association (“ABA”) 
declined to endorse the UMDA in its original form for a number of 
reasons, after some revisions, the ABA approved the UMDA.53 
The NCCUSL and ABA presenting a united front proved vital to 
 47.  Id. at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 48.  Id. From 1970 to 1975, evidence of marital misconduct was allowed 
to be presented to the courts in an effort to assist the court in determining 
whether irreconcilable differences were present between the couple, however 
this provision was repealed in 1975, thereby making fault completely 
irrelevant.  DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 46, at 583–84.   
 49.  W. Bradford Wilcox, The Evolution of Divorce, NAT’L AFFAIRS (Fall 
2009),  http://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/the-evolution-of-
divorce.  Wilcox suggests that one reason Reagan may have supported the bill 
was because his first wife, Jane Wyman, had “unfairly accused him of ‘mental 
cruelty’ to obtain a divorce in 1948.”  Id.   
 50.  The NCCUSL, established in 1892 and now known as the Uniform 
Law Commission (“ULC”), is a non-profit, non-partisan group made up of 
“practicing lawyers, judges, legislators and legislative staff and law 
professors, who have been appointed . . . to research, draft and promote 
enactment of uniform state laws in areas of state law where uniformity is 
desirable and practical.” About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About%20the%20ULC (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2014).  ULC members work together to create a model or 
recommended act, such as the UMDA, and then individual members work to 
enact the recommended or model acts in their home jurisdictions.  Id.  
 51.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 87.   
 52.  Id.   
 53.  Id.  
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the success of nationwide divorce reform.54 
Following California’s lead and the ABA’s approval of the 
UMDA, the no-fault movement began to spread across the 
country.  By 1989, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia 
had adopted some no-fault ground for divorce, with twenty of the 
states providing for divorce solely on no-fault grounds.55  In 2010, 
New York became the final state to enact a “true” no-fault divorce, 
adding as a ground for a unilateral (or non-consensual) divorce 
that “the relationship between husband and wife has broken down 
irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one 
party has so stated under oath.”56 
However, California’s no-fault legislation was not quite as 
groundbreaking as it seems.  Prior to 1970, several states had a 
no-fault provision embedded in their fault-based divorce laws, 
usually based on couples living apart for a proscribed period of 
time.57  For example, a Rhode Island law that dates back to 1893, 
 allowed for divorce of married couples who lived apart for ten 
or more years, and Wisconsin had a similar law dating back to 
1866.58  So, the seeds of no-fault divorce had been sewn for some 
time.  But, what was unique about California’s legislation was 
that it eliminated all prior fault grounds available in divorce 
actions in favor of an exclusively no-fault system.59 
Though seemingly counter-intuitive, the legislative intent 
behind enacting the Family Law Act of 1969 was to counter the 
rising divorce rates by making it more difficult to obtain a 
divorce.60  The emphasis was on “dissolving only the truly 
hopeless marriages,” and the courts were tasked with determining 
whether “‘substantial reasons’ for abandoning the marriage” were 
present, whereby judges would make an independent 
 54.  See Harvey L. Zuckman, The ABA Family Law Section v. The 
NCCUSL: Alienation, Separation and Forced Reconciliation over the Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 61, 73–74 (1974).   
 55.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 88.   
 56.  See Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in 
Family Law: Working Toward More Uniformity in Laws Relating to Families, 
44 FAM. L.Q. 469, 497 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 57.  See James Herbie Difonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 
886 (2000).   
 58.  Id. at 887.   
 59.  Id.  
 60.  Id. at 903. 
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determination as to the status of the marriage.61  Taking its 
charge with only dissolving those marriages that were “truly 
hopeless” very seriously, the California Supreme Court specifically 
rejected the idea that the parties could consent to dissolving their 
marriage and have that consent be sufficient to establish 
irreconcilable differences between the couple.62 
Additionally, a no-fault divorce scheme was thought to dignify 
the divorce process and reduce the strain on a family’s emotional 
and financial resources at time when these resources are most 
crucial.63  Requiring a finding of fault in divorce proceedings often 
resulted in “costly, bitter, counterproductive litigation that 
impeded reconciliation.”64  Jacob, again, sums this notion up 
nicely: 
[A] widespread cause for dissatisfaction with the divorce 
law was that is forced family disputes into the 
adversarial mode of court actions.  Most divorce cases 
already had an uncomfortably high degree of emotional 
conflict. Many divorce attorneys felt that the 
requirements of the adversarial system heighted that 
conflict to unacceptable levels . . . The system seemed 
designed to promote and exacerbate conflict, rather than 
to provide a way to find compromises and to get the 
divorce in as painless a fashion as possible.65 
Certainly it was also a concern that the children of the parties 
suffered the most as a result of the hostility brought about by the 
divorce process.66  So, it was believed that by sparing the 
divorcing parties the requirement of proving fault, hostility 
amongst the separating parties would decrease, and the children, 
if any, would be better off.67 
 61.  Id. at 903–04. 
 62.  See In re Marriage of McKim, 493 P.2d 868, 872 (Cal. 1972). 
 63.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 92.   
 64.  Id.  
 65.  JACOB, supra note 36, at 68.   
 66.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 92.   
 67.  Id. at 92–93.  Wardle’s article also discusses several other arguments 
put forth in support of a shift to no-fault divorce, including preserving the 
integrity of the legal system generally, as well as bridging the gap between 
“divorce law as written and divorce law as applied.”  Id. at 93–94.  She states 
that no-fault divorces were widely available prior to the 1970s shift in 
legislation, either through collusion by both of the parties or via migratory 
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As the idea no-fault divorce began to catch on, though 
contrary to California’s original intent, proponents of the no-fault 
system used it to promote the “assertion that divorce was a 
private matter that the state had no legitimate interest to restrict 
when the marriage was irretrievably broken and the parties had 
agreed to terminate the marriage.”68  By eliminating a 
requirement of fault, divorcing parties were protected from having 
to disclose in a court of law “the most intimate and often 
embarrassing details of married life.”69  Many believed that the 
state’s interest in protecting the institution of marriage no longer 
justified “requiring disclosure of the marriage’s failings if it was 
undisputed by the parties that the marriage was irretrievably 
broken.”70 
III.  THE NEW STANDARD 
The UMDA suggested that fault grounds for divorce be 
replaced with a sole standard: the irretrievable breakdown of the 
marriage.  The drafters of the UMDA thought that having one 
single standard would “redirect the law’s attention from an 
unproductive assignment of blame to a search for the realities of 
the marital situation.”71  In short, while difficult for some 
divorcing parties to understand, the single standard approach 
supported the notion that once a marriage was over, it was futile 
to try to figure out where to assign blame.  Rather, more times 
than not, determining fault would just “bog the court down into 
divorce.  Id. at 94.  Because of the problems with migratory divorce, it was 
also believed that more uniformity needed to exist amongst the states with 
regard to divorce law, which in turn led to the proposal of the Uniform 
Marriage and Divorce Act by the NCCUSL.  Id. at 96.  See also Peter Nash 
Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31 FAM L.Q. 269, 
270–71 (1997) (Under the fault-based divorce regime, couples in unhappy 
marriages often fabricated fault based grounds for divorce or resorted to 
perjury in an effort to obtain a divorce, often  with the assistance of counsel.  
Wealthier couples could bypass the process by obtaining divorces from more 
lenient states, referred to as “divorce mills,” or from various foreign countries 
that offered “quickie” divorces).   
 68.  Id. at 96.   
 69.  See Joseph Goldstein & Max Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for 
Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary, 3 FAM L.Q. 75, 82 (1969).   
 70.  Wardle, supra note 1, at 96.   
 71.  UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–309, prefatory note 
(amended 1973), 9A U.L.A 159, 161 (1998).   
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considering emotionally charged factual issues which are often 
more relevant to the parties themselves than to the attorneys or 
the court.”72 Additionally, as one can imagine, rarely would it be 
the case that the deterioration of a marriage was the fault of 
exclusively one party. 
The “irreconcilable differences” standard, which is similar to 
the “irretrievable breakdown of the marriage” standard that is set 
forth by the UMDA, is present in several state divorce statutes 
including Rhode Island.73  The standard, a popular ground upon 
which celebrity couples file for divorce (likely because this 
standard is the relevant one under California law), requires not 
only a showing that irreconcilable differences exist between the 
parties, but either explicitly through statute, as is the case in 
Rhode Island, or through “judicial construction . . . that [the] 
differences have caused an irremediable breakdown of the 
marriage.”74  Again, this standard was implemented to “provide a 
less painful alternative to traditional grounds for divorce . . . by 
removing from domestic relations litigation the issue of marital 
fault as a determining factor.”75 
A.   Rhode Island Adds “Irreconcilable Differences” 
Rhode Island followed the nationwide trend and added 
irreconcilable differences as a no-fault grounds for divorce in 1975, 
currently codified in section 15-5-3.1 of the Rhode Island General 
 72.  Brett R. Turner, The Role of Marital Misconduct in Dividing 
Property upon Divorce, 15 DIVORCE LITIG. 117, 118 (2003). 
 73.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006).  Irreconcilable 
differences is also an appropriate ground for legal separation, also known as 
separation from bed and board.  See Hamel v. Hamel, 426 A.2d 259, 261 (R.I. 
1981).   
 74.  See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005).   
 75.  Id.  However, when a party proceeds in divorce litigation under the 
irreconcilable differences standard, this does not preclude the opposing party 
from proceeding under a fault based standard where such standards are 
available by statute.  See Ebbert v. Ebbert, 459 A.2d 282, 284 (N.H. 1983) 
(holding it was error to require two separate decrees of divorce when husband 
wanted to proceed on the fault based grounds of adultery and wife wanted to 
proceed on the no-fault grounds of irreconcilable differences).  But, where 
both irreconcilable differences and misconduct are pleaded, and “it appears 
that the parties separated as a result of mutual differences before the 
misconduct occurred,” irreconcilable differences is the appropriate grounds 
upon which to grant the divorce.  See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005) (citing 
Murano v. Murano, 442 A.2d 597, 601 (N.H. 1982)).  
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Laws.76  There is little information about the circumstances 
surrounding the General Assembly’s decision to implement no-
fault grounds.  Rather, it appears that Rhode Island was simply 
following the trend, and adding a no-fault ground was the next 
logical step.  But, looking at what was perhaps the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court’s first opportunity to interpret the irreconcilable 
differences ground suggests that the ground was enacted to 
comport with many of the same goals of no-fault divorce that other 
jurisdictions were looking to achieve.77  In Hamel v. Hamel, the 
court interpreted irreconcilable differences, albeit as it applied to 
a divorce from bed and board (i.e. a legal separation) versus an 
absolute divorce, as clearly removing the “fault factor from divorce 
proceedings” and “abolish[ing] the necessity of presenting what 
may be the distasteful details of personal conduct by either 
party.”78 
The court in Hamel also cited a Texas Court of Appeals case, 
Baxla v. Baxla, for its discussion of the policy goals underlying no-
fault divorce.79  In that case, the court, although recognizing there 
had not “yet been time for much judicial interpretation” of new no-
fault divorce statutes, still stated with ample conviction that it 
was 
manifestly clear from the legislative history of many, if 
not all, of the statutes, that the purpose and intent of the 
legislatures of the various states, including Texas, is to 
abolish the necessity of presenting sordid and ugly details 
of conduct on the part of either spouse to the marriage in 
order to obtain a decree of divorce.80 
The Baxla court went on to say that “legislators believed that 
removing considerations of fault and eliminating the incentive to 
present fault evidence would materially reduce the bitterness and 
acrimony which had attended divorce proceedings.”81  The Rhode 
 76.  See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261; see also Ronald J. Resmini, The Law of 
Domestic Relations in Rhode Island, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 408 (1995).  
Additional fault-based grounds for divorce remained available to divorcing 
parties.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-2 (West 2006). 
 77.  See Turner, supra note 72, at 118–19. 
 78.  See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261.   
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).   
 81.  Id.   
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Island Supreme Court’s interpretation of the irreconcilable 
differences standard in Hamel and its reliance on the discussion in 
Baxla suggests that the standard was in fact implemented to 
achieve the frequently cited policy goals underlying no-fault 
divorce.82  As I will unearth, however, the current construction 
and application of section 15-5-3.1, with its explicit preservation of 
fault, makes it difficult (if not impossible) to achieve these goals. 
A.   Applying the New Standard 
It is well settled in jurisdictions using the irreconcilable 
differences standard that whether the differences between the 
parties are irreconcilable is a determination to be made by the 
court.83  If the court determines that the differences are in fact 
irreconcilable, a second similar inquiry is performed by the court 
to determine whether those differences have resulted in the 
irremediable breakdown of the marriage.84  The court uses a 
subjective test to make this determination, using the parties’ state 
of mind as a frame of reference.85  However, the differences need 
not be considered irreconcilable by both parties.86  Unless 
required by statute, consent by both parties for a divorce on this 
ground is not required.87 
Ironically, the inquiry by the court in determining whether 
the differences between the parties are in fact irreconcilable 
 82.  See Hamel, 426 A.2d at 261; See Baxla, 522 S.W.2d at 738; See 
Turner, supra note 72, at 118–19. 
 83. See 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005) (citing Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 
558, 560 (R.I. 1984)).  As an aside, the husband’s attorney in Hamel makes an 
interesting argument that no differences are truly irreconcilable.  See 426 
A.2d at 261.  He argued, “[a] perfect example is World War II.  We had an 
irreconcilable difference with Japan, and then ‘whammo,’ we reconciled the 
difference.”  Id.  
 84.  27A C.J.S. Divorce § 31 (2005).   
 85.  Id.   
 86.  Id.  Some courts may consider the fact that one spouse wishes to 
continue the marriage as “evidence of reasonable possibility of reconciliation” 
but, “if [the] other spouse resolutely refuses to continue marriage and it is 
clear from passage of time or other circumstances that there is no reasonable 
possibility of change of heart, there is irremediable breakdown of marriage.”  
Id. at n.14; see Desrochers v. Desrochers, 347 A.2d 150, 153 (N.H. 1975). 
 87.  Id. South Dakota, for example, requires consent by both parties to 
grant a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, unless a party 
fails to appear.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-17.2 (2013); MISS. CODE. ANN. 
§ 93-5-2 (West 2007). 
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requires some consideration of fault by one or both of the parties.  
In the oft-cited Rhode Island Supreme Court case Tarro v. Tarro, 
the Court upheld a trial judge’s finding of fact that both parties 
were responsible for the breakdown of the marriage.88  In 
reaching this conclusion, the trial judge explicitly considered 
evidence of the husband’s “alleged adulterous relationship.”89 
Despite the fact that the Court noted that fault had been “largely 
eliminated as a factor in Rhode Island divorce proceedings,” and 
applauded its shift to a more modern no-fault system, it held that 
the trial judge’s conclusion that the parties were equally at fault 
for the breakdown of the marriage was not erroneous.90  The irony 
of this decision is apparent given the fact that Rhode Island law 
not only sought to eliminate a showing of fault by the parties to a 
divorce proceeding from a policy standpoint, but unambiguously 
provides that “allegations or evidence of specific acts of 
misconduct shall be improper and inadmissible.”91  Rather, in 
light of the goals behind no-fault divorce, the focus should be on 
the state of the marriage as it currently exists, and not who was 
responsible for getting it to that state. 
IV.  DIVIDING MARITAL ASSETS 
The actual dissolution of the marriage is only half the battle 
in divorce litigation. Thus, the backhand consideration of fault in 
determining whether irreconcilable differences exist between a 
married couple is of minimal concern when one is alerted to the 
fact that fault is explicitly considered in Rhode Island’s law 
governing the division of marital assets, as well as when awarding 
alimony and legal costs and fees.92 
Alimony and property division are the two primary 
procedures by which property is distributed amongst divorcing 
parties.93  Historically, these mechanisms were created as a 
 88.  Tarro, 485 A.2d at 561.   
 89.  Id.   
 90.  Id. 
 91.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006); See also 27A C.J.S. 
Divorce § 31 (2005) (“the determination whether irreconcilable differences 
exist should not be controlled by fault of the parties.”). 
 92.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-3.1.  Fault is also considered when 
determining child custody and visitation; however, that is beyond the scope of 
this paper.   
 93.  JACOB, supra note 36, at 112.   
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means to support the wife following a divorce.94  Because 
marriage was considered a “lifelong obligation,” a wife was 
entitled to receive alimony following a divorce as a means to 
support herself for the rest of her life, or at the very least, until 
she remarried and could depend on another husband for financial 
support.95  When alimony alone was not enough, a wife could be 
awarded some of the husband’s property upon divorce to make up 
the difference.96  Central to both of these concepts of was the idea 
that following a divorce, most women would be unable to support 
themselves on their own, and thus, they required some form of 
continued financial support.97 
Traditionally, fault was an important consideration in 
determining alimony and property division following a divorce, 
with the at-fault spouse often being penalized in the process.98  
For example, in many states, a wife who had committed adultery 
during the course of the marriage was not eligible for alimony.99  
In some community property100 states, such as California, the 
 94.  See id.  
 95.  Id.   
 96.  Id.  
 97.  Id.  In turn, alimony and the transfer of property also decreased the 
likelihood that divorced women would have to rely on public assistance 
programs, such as welfare, following divorce.  Id.   
 98.  Id. at 113.   
 99.  Id. at 112.   
 100.  In community property states, such as California, “all property 
acquired after marriage, by either husband or wife” is presumed to be 
“common property,” with the exception of that property acquired by “gift, 
bequest, devise or descent.” Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247, 251 (1859).  The 
presumption can be rebutted by “clear and decisive proof” that the property 
was purchased using the separate funds of either spouse.  Id. at 252.  Then 
Chief Justice Stone of the California Supreme Court said about community 
property: 
The statute proceeds upon the theory that the marriage, in respect 
to property acquired during its existence, is a community of which 
each spouse is a member, equally contributing by his or her industry 
to its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed to the 
property after dissolution . . . To the community all acquisitions by 
either, whether made jointly or separately, belong.   
Id. at 251.  The community property concept was derived from Spanish law, 
and is mostly present in the Western states, including California, Texas, New 
Mexico and Arizona.  Charles W. Willey, Effect in Montana of Community-
Source Property Acquired in Another State (and Its Impact on A Montana 
Marriage Dissolution, Estate Planning, Property Transfers, and Probate), 69 
MONT. L. REV. 313, 322–23 (2008). 
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innocent spouse was eligible for more than the traditional “half” of 
the community property, and in common law states,101 an at-fault 
wife was not eligible for any of the husband’s property upon 
divorce.102 
As fault was beginning to be eliminated from divorce 
proceedings, it became necessary for the legislature and the courts 
to reconsider the relevant facts for determining alimony and 
property division following a divorce.  When the NCCUSL 
proposed its no-fault system through the UMDA, it also proposed 
that fault be eliminated from consideration when dividing marital 
property and awarding alimony.103  Jacob cites Professor Robert 
Levy, who pitched his idea to the NCCUSL, to articulate the logic 
behind removing fault from determining alimony and property 
division: the purpose of no fault divorce—to remove the need to 
argue over misbehavior throughout the course of the marriage—
could not possibly be achieved if the argument was still preserved 
for alimony and property division.104 Professor Levy also 
recommended that common law states adopt a “marital property” 
standard, similar to that of community property states, which was 
to include “all assets acquired during the marriage, regardless of 
which spouse happened to hold title.”105  Levy alluded to the fact 
that an equal distribution of the assets would be most appropriate 
so as to “minimize conflict” throughout the property division 
process, though, for reasons political or otherwise, he did not 
explicitly endorse the idea.106  Yet, Levy’s most revolutionary 
proposal was something no state had really considered before: he 
suggested that a wife’s homemaking services be considered as a 
contribution to the marital estate in the same way that the 
husband’s wages earned outside of the home had customarily been 
 101.  In common law states, property acquired by one spouse during the 
course of the marriage does not automatically become property of the 
marriage; rather, it can be owned by either spouse, and “is held jointly only 
when one or both spouses elect to take title jointly or property is gifted to 
spouses as co-owners.” See Emily Osborn, The Treatment of Unearned 
Separate Property at Divorce in Common Law Property Jurisdictions, 1990 
WIS. L. REV. 903, 906 (1990). 
 102.  JACOB, supra note 36, at 113.   
 103.  Id. at 117.   
 104.  Id. at 118. 
 105.  Id.   
 106.  Id.  
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considered.107 
Adjusting property division and alimony law in conjunction 
with a shift to a no-fault system was easier for some states than 
others.  California, for example, already had a community 
property standard, wherein all property acquired during the 
marriage, unless proven otherwise, was joint property that was to 
be split equally upon divorce.108  After adopting no-fault divorce, 
the only adjustment required for California law was a removal of 
its permission to allow the innocent party in a divorce to receive 
more than half of the community property.109  The result is 
California’s current statute, which provides that upon divorce or 
legal separation of the parties, the community estate is to be 
divided equally.110  This statute appears to be a reflection of the 
true no-fault system that Professor Levy had in mind.  Though 
slower to catch on than no-fault divorce, by the mid-1980s most 
states had changed their standards pertaining to the division of 
property upon divorce by adopting the “marital property” idea, 
and, in many states fault was no longer a consideration when 
dividing the marital assets.111 
Today, in most states, the division of marital assets upon 
divorce is considered much like that of the dissolution of a 
business partnership, consistent with the UMDA’s suggestion.112  
The view that marriage is a “shared enterprise” is the idea that 
each party is entitled to a share of the assets following dissolution 
of the marriage, regardless of who holds title to the property, so 
long as the property was accrued during the course of the 
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 113.   
 109.  Id. at 120.   
 110.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).   
 111.  JACOB, supra note 36, at 121.  Additionally, alimony was 
transformed from a permanent device to support an innocent ex-wife, at least 
until she re-married, into a temporary payment system until the wife could 
support herself.  Id. at 125.  Rhode Island’s current structure for alimony 
reflects this idea.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp. 
2013) (“Alimony is designed to provide support for a spouse for a reasonable 
length of time to enable the recipient to become financially independent and 
self-sufficient.”). 
 112.  UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT §§ 101–309, prefatory note 
(amended 1973), 9A U.L.A 159, 161 (1998) (“the distribution of property upon 
the termination of a marriage should be treated, as nearly as possible, like 
the distribution of assets incident to the dissolution of a partnership.”). 
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marriage.113  In the majority of jurisdictions, marital misconduct 
is considered only in circumstances where it has an economic 
impact on the marital estate.114  Some courts in jurisdictions that 
use an equitable division of the assets standard have held that 
fault is simply not relevant when deciding what property belongs 
to which party, but rather “each spouse should receive his or her 
fair share of what has been accumulated during the marriage.  
The concept of fault is not relevant to such distribution since all 
that is being [a]ffected is the allocation to each party of what 
really belongs to him or her.”115  In short, if one party is at fault 
for the breakdown of the marriage, that does not undermine his or 
her contribution to the marital estate.  Other courts have 
subscribed to the belief that “[d]ivorce is not a vehicle by which 
one spouse is compensated . . . for having had to suffer during the 
marriage.”116  Additionally, consistent with the reasoning for 
removing fault from divorce is the understanding that fault can be 
difficult to prove, is highly personal in nature, and can often be 
traced to both parties.117 
But, where martial misconduct has a direct effect on the 
couple’s assets, most states have held that such misconduct is in 
fact relevant.118  For example, purely economic misconduct, such 
as dissipation of marital funds by one party, is clearly relevant to 
a court assigning marital property.119 However, noneconomic 
misconduct that has an economic effect on marital assets may also 
be considered, even when traditional fault grounds have been 
removed from consideration.120  So, while a party’s infidelity on its 
own may be irrelevant, the use of marital funds to finance the 
 113.  See Lee R. Russ, Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution 
Doctrine, 41 A.L.R.4th 481, § 3 (1985).  There are circumstances where 
property accrued during the course of the marriage is not considered 
community or marital property; however, the determination of what 
constitutes marital property to be divided upon divorce is beyond the scope of 
this article.   
 114.  See Turner, supra note 72, at 117.  
 115.  See Chalmers v. Chalmers, 320 A.2d 478, 483 (N.J. 1974).   
 116.  See Hatayama v. Hatayama, 818 P.2d 277, 282 (Haw. App. 1991).   
 117. See Robert D. Lang, Marital Fault and Equitable Distribution: Two 
Unrelated Concepts, 66 N.Y. ST. B.J. 36, 36 (1994). 
 118.  See Turner, supra note 72, at 119. 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 120.  
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affair can still be considered.121  This is consistent with the 
UMDA’s “business partnership” model because, while fault 
pertaining to the dissolution of the partnership is of no matter, 
one partner’s misuse of the business’s funds certainly is.122 
A.   Equitable Division versus Equal Division 
There is an important distinction between equitable division 
of the assets and equal division of the assets that is relevant when 
considering the goals of no-fault divorce and how a jurisdiction’s 
choice of standard when dividing marital property is significant.  
Most states, including Rhode Island, follow an equitable division 
standard.123  While intuitively an equitable division standard 
suggests that marital property should be divided based on the 
contribution of each party to the marital estate (similar to the idea 
of an equity contribution to a business or personal property, like a 
mortgage), the idea of an “equitable division” has been interpreted 
much more broadly and in favor the colloquial definition of the 
word: “dealing fairly or equally with all concerned.”124 
Accordingly, many judges depart from an equal division of the 
marital property so as to “do the fairest thing given the 
circumstances.”125 
There is a compelling argument that an equitable division 
standard, by its very nature, opens the door to a consideration of 
fault when dividing marital assets.  In his article, Distribution of 
Marital Assets in Community Property Jurisdictions: Equitable 
Doesn’t Equal Equal, James Ratner, professor at University of 
Arizona’s James E. Rogers College of Law, addressed these 
concerns.126  He stated that equitable division undermines the 
purpose of the community property approach altogether, the crux 
of which is that each spouse is entitled to “undivided present 
 121.  Id. at 119. “While the mere fact that the husband had an 
extramarital affair is irrelevant, the fact that the husband spent $10,000 in 
marital property taking a cruise with his paramour can still be considered.”  
Id.  
 122.  Id. at 118. 
 123.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1 (West 2006).  
 124.  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 392 (10th ed. 1993). 
 125.  James R. Ratner, Distribution of Marital Assets in Community 
Property Jurisdictions: Equitable Doesn’t Equal Equal, 72 LA. L. REV. 21, 23 
(2011).  
 126.  See generally id. 
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ownership of all community assets, regardless of which spouse 
generated the asset and the behavior of the spouse during the 
marriage.”127  Considering this universally accepted underlying 
goal, as evidenced by a uniform shift to recognizing marital 
property as the property of both parties, it is interesting that an 
equal division of marital assets is the minority approach.128  In 
fact, only three states (California, Louisiana, and New Mexico) 
follow a strict equal division of the marital estate, regardless of 
who contributed more.129  An equitable division of the assets, 
according to Ratner, gives divorce courts “open-ended and largely 
unreviewable equitable discretion concerning division of 
community worth [which] undermines horizontal equity, renders 
property division at divorce a high-stakes judicial lottery, and 
likely raises the costs of obtaining a divorce”—all things that no-
fault divorce and a community property approach, sought to 
minimize.130  Of course, these standards and considerations only 
become relevant if the parties cannot come to an agreement on the 
division of the marital assets on their own. 
B.   Dividing Marital Property in Rhode Island 
In addition to applying an equitable division standard, Rhode 
Island is among the minority of jurisdictions that permits a 
consideration of fault in assigning property and awarding alimony 
without requiring an explicit showing that the misconduct had an 
adverse economic impact on any marital assets.131  Rhode Island 
law provides that while fault is not to be considered when 
granting a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, a 
 127.  Id. at 34.   
 128.  Id.  
 129.  Id.   
 130.  Id. at 35.   
 131.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1 (West 2006).  According to a 
study entitled “The Role of Marital Misconduct in Dividing Property Upon 
Divorce” done by the National Legal Research Group, which appeared in 15 
No. 7 Divorce Litig. 117, seventeen jurisdictions consider any type of marital 
misconduct when dividing marital property: Alabama, Connecticut, 
Washington DC, Georgia, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Missouri, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, 
Texas, Vermont, Virginia and Wyoming.  Id.  Three states—Arkansas, 
Kansas, and New York—require that conduct meet a certain threshold (such 
as “egregious” or “gross and extreme”) before it can be considered.  Id.  
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consideration of fault is preserved for assignment of property, 
alimony, and legal fees.132  Rhode Island courts have routinely 
allowed the admission of marital misconduct in hearings 
pertaining to property assignment and the shares of the marital 
estate awarded in light of such conduct suggests a trend: spouses 
who misbehave (overwhelmingly, the husband) are punished for 
their conduct with an unfavorable assignment of property or an 
otherwise unnecessary award of alimony.133 
A review of Rhode Island case law suggests that a broad 
range of fault has been considered when assigning marital 
property and awarding alimony.  In assigning marital property, 
the court must first determine which assets are marital 
properties; it must then consider the factors set forth in section 
15-5-16.1(a); and finally, it will distribute the property.134 The 
statute states that one of the twelve factors that the court is to 
consider when dividing marital property is “the conduct of the 
parties during the marriage.”135  Although Rhode Island courts 
have interpreted the term “conduct” to include both good and bad 
behavior by both parties throughout the course of the marriage,136 
the conduct relied on is, more often than not, bad behavior. 
For example, in Wrobleski v. Wrobleksi, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court upheld the wife’s award of 60% of the marital 
estate (valued at approximately $2.2 million), and an alimony 
award of $5,000 per month for five years and $2,000 thereafter 
until a further order, despite the fact that the wife “posses[ed] 
sufficient earning ability as a teacher.”137  The wife was not in 
need of rehabilitation, as alimony is intended for; instead, her 
alimony was awarded based largely on her husband’s alleged 
alcohol problem, extramarital affair, and time spent “at work or 
out socially away from his family” which led to the deterioration of 
 132.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-3.1 (West 2006).   
 133.  See, e.g., DeAngelis v. DeAngelis, 923 A.2d 1274 (R.I. 2007), 
Thompson v. Thompson, 642 A.2d 1160 (R.I. 1994).  
 134.  See Horton v. Horton, 891 A.2d 885, 889 (R.I. 2006); Koutroumanos 
v. Tzeremes, 865 A.2d 1091, 1096 (R.I. 2005); Stephenson v. Stephenson, 811 
A.2d 1138, 1141 (R.I. 2002).  This paper is limited to considering the second 
step of the process, wherein the factors set forth in section 15-5-16.1(a) are 
applied.   
 135.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1(a)(2). 
 136.  See Tarro v. Tarro, 485 A.2d 558, 561 (R.I. 1984) (citations omitted).  
 137.  653 A.3d 732, 733 (R.I. 1995).   
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their marriage.138  Evidence of a husband’s extramarital affair, 
including that he had brought his new romantic partner around 
the couple’s children, was similarly considered by the court in 
Vicario v. Vicario, and the wife was ultimately awarded 60% of the 
marital estate despite the fact that, even including consideration 
of the wife’s homemaking services, the husband contributed more 
financially to the value of the estate.139  Similarly, in Giammarco 
v. Giammarco, the Court upheld a general magistrate’s award of 
only 35% of the marital estate to a wife that was found “to be 
totally at fault in the breakdown of the marriage.”140  DeAngelis v. 
DeAngelis is yet another example of an inequitable division of 
assets based largely in traditional fault based notions.141  In that 
case, the Court upheld an award of 80% of the marital estate to 
the wife based on the trial court’s finding that the husband was 
“solely at fault for the deterioration of the marriage.”142  Central 
to the court’s considerations was the husband’s alleged alcoholism 
and infidelity, as well as other “egregious” behavior.143 
However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court did seem to get 
the analysis right in Koutroumanos v. Tzeremes.144  There, the 
Court upheld an equal division of the marital estate, save for 
$77,000 in debt assigned to the husband that was a result of  his 
“reckless investment practices” achieved “primarily by taking cash 
advances against credit cards to purchase stocks.”145  In assigning 
the marital estate, the Court did not appear to consider any type 
of non-economic fault, including the fact that the husband had 
pled nolo contendere to domestic assault at one time during the 
course of the marriage.146 
Interestingly, the Koutroumanos trial was bifurcated, with 
one hearing as to the dissolution of the marriage and custody of 
the parties’ children and another as to the division of the marital 
assets.147  This presents a potentially promising process by which 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  901 A.2d 603, 606, 608 (R.I. 2006).   
 140.  959 A.2d 531, 534 (R.I. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 141.  923 A.2d. 1274 (R.I. 2007).   
 142.  Id. at 1281–82.   
 143.  Id.  
  144.     865 A.2d at 1091, 1099 (R.I. 2005).   
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. at 1095.   
 147.  Id. at 1094.   
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fault can become as far removed as possible when determining 
division of marital assets.  If the determination as to whether the 
differences between the couple are irreconcilable (thus warranting 
a divorce) is made at one trial, even if traditional fault-based 
factors are considered (as precedent suggests they are), they need 
not be considered when dividing the marital property if that 
determination is made at a second hearing.  This would insulate 
fault-based considerations from the process as much as is likely 
possible. 
Perhaps where a party opts to plead, and can prove, fault in a 
divorce pursuant to section 15-5-2 of the Rhode Island General 
Laws,148 he or she should get the benefit of using that same fault 
to his or her advantage when dividing marital assets.  That is the 
approach taken in Texas, though only to a certain extent; an 
appellate court there has held that although fault is a factor when 
dividing the marital asset when it is pleaded and proven in a 
divorce, “an unequal division of the community estate may not be 
awarded to punish the party at ‘fault.’”149  However, when a party 
decides on the no-fault route, whatever the motivation, this should 
foreclose the opportunity to introduce fault for the purposes of 
dividing marital property.  After all, you can’t have your cake and 
eat it too. 
C.   Make it Equal, or at Least More Equitable 
The explicit consideration of fault when determining property 
assignment, alimony, legal fees, and child custody clearly 
undermines the underlying goals of no-fault divorce. It 
 148.  Section 15-5-2 of the R.I. General Laws states: 
Divorces from the bond of marriage shall also be decreed for the 
following causes: (1) Impotency; (2) Adultery; (3) Extreme cruelty; (4) 
Willful desertion for five (5) years of either of the parties, or for 
willful desertion for a shorter period of time in the discretion of the 
court; (5) Continued drunkenness; (6) The habitual, excessive, and 
intemperate use of opium, morphine, or chloral; (7) Neglect and 
refusal, for the period of at least one year next before the filing of the 
petition, on the part of the husband to provide necessaries for the 
subsistence of his wife, the husband being of sufficient ability; and 
(8) Any other gross misbehavior and wickedness, in either of the 
parties, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant. 
 149.  See Phillips v. Phillips, 75 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. App. 2002) 
(citations omitted).   
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incentivizes parties facing separation to keep a score card of poor 
behavior, vet out details of indiscretions, and further swells the 
already amplified wave of emotions that parties to a divorce are 
experiencing. To counter this phenomenon, equal division of 
marital property, as used in California,150 Louisiana,151 and New 
Mexico,152 would be the ideal standard.  Applying an equal 
division standard would decrease litigation length and costs in two 
ways:  it would remove unnecessary litigation pertaining to fault, 
as well as eliminate litigation pertaining to who contributed what 
percentage to the marital estate. The only necessary 
determination left to make would be what constitutes marital 
property.  While there would still be some litigation pertaining to 
this issue, it would be minimal in comparison to that surrounding 
fault and contribution, and would not directly undermine the 
goals of no-fault divorce. 
If equal division of the assets is too drastic a transformation 
for the Rhode Island General Assembly, there is still hope: the 
current equitable division standard can be vastly improved so as 
to coincide with the goals of no-fault divorce.  First, a true 
equitable division standard can be used—one which considers only 
the contributions of the parties to the marital estate, without any 
other consideration of fault. For example, a Michigan case 
overturned an inequitable award of the marital estate to a 
husband based largely on the wife’s infidelity during the marriage 
because the court gave too much weight to findings of fault when 
dividing the marital property.153  The court reasoned that “[a] 
woman who was an effective partner through a quarter of a 
century, assisting in the acquisition of assets, and employed 
throughout, is entitled to a more equal disposition.”154  Although 
this court suggests fault may be one of many factors to consider 
when dividing property, it notes that fault of either party is 
certainly not “dispositive.”155  Be that as it may, the strong 
dissent in that case is exactly on point, advocating to remove fault 
from the process entirely, stating that continuing to allow fault in 
 150.  See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 2004).   
 151.  See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2801 (2008). 
 152.  See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (West 2006). 
 153.  See Sparks v. Sparks, 485 N.W.2d 893, 903 (Mich. 1992). 
 154.  Id.  
 155.  Id. 
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hearings for marital assignments would result in “divorce 
proceeding[s] [to] again become a forum for finger-pointing and 
ventilating grievances, and the law return[ing] full circle to where 
it was immediately before the Legislature enacted the no-fault 
statute.”156 
One primary concern with the equitable division standard is 
the idea that parties who don’t contribute financially to a 
marriage (overwhelmingly women) are severely disadvantaged 
upon separation and divorce where the relevant law divides assets 
based solely on contribution to the marital estate.  However, 
inclusion of a party’s contribution and services as a homemaker in 
statutes guiding property assignment, present in the Rhode Island 
statute, helps protect parties whose contributions have been 
largely, or solely, within the home.157  Additionally, alimony 
persists as a rehabilitative measure for parties who were “absent 
from employment while fulfilling homemaking responsibilities” 
with specific consideration given to “the extent to which any 
education, skills, or experience of that party have become 
outmoded and his or her earning capacity diminished.”158 
Rhode Island law already includes wasteful dissipation of 
assets as a consideration when dividing property consistent with 
the UMDA’s business model approach.159  Further, I would be 
remiss to say that it is unreasonable for courts to consider 
misconduct when assigning property when the behavior is 
particularly egregious.  New York law provides a promising 
framework for this standard, considering both economic 
misconduct and egregious behavior, evincing a very high standard 
for the latter.  In finding that fault would be difficult to determine 
and unnecessarily time consuming, the New York Court of 
Appeals ruled in O’Brien v. O’Brien that marital fault should not 
ordinarily be considered in equitable distribution.160  However, 
New York courts have preserved the consideration of “egregious 
fault” and that which has resulted in dissipation of marital 
assets.161  New York courts have set a very high bar for egregious 
 156.  Id. at 905 (Levin, J., dissenting).   
 157.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §15-5-16.1(a)(4) (West 2006). 
 158.  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16 (West 2006 & Supp. 2013).  
 159.  See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-16.1(a)(11) (West 2006). 
 160.  489 N.E.2d 712, 719 (N.Y. 1985).  
 161.  See Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472 N.Y.S.2d 110, 113–14 (N.Y. App. 
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fault, and have considered only misconduct that “shocks the 
conscience,”162 such as a husband attacking his wife with a knife 
and inflicting numerous serious wounds resulting in surgery and 
therapy163 and a husband, who was a practicing attorney, 
planning a failed attempt in which he bribed a Romanian terrorist 
to kill his wife,164 as meeting the threshold. A New York appellate 
court has indicated that satisfying the “egregious fault” standard 
is rare, holding that adultery alone is generally insufficient.165  
This heightened standard, while preserving fault to some extent, 
would flush out a majority of the tireless litigation that no-fault 
divorce sought to eliminate. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Certainly there is no perfect solution to divorce litigation.  
Even if the no-fault system were working flawlessly, evidence of 
fault and marital misconduct would likely not be absent from the 
process entirely.  Anyone familiar to divorce litigation knows that, 
regardless of whether it is expressly considered or not, when fault 
is alleged by either or both of the parties, it will be used as a 
backhand bargaining chip to gain an advantage in litigation.  But, 
the less that traditional notions of fault are relied on throughout 
the process, the closer we will be to achieving the material goals of 
the no-fault system: quicker, more cost-efficient divorce litigation, 
and, to the extent possible, more harmonious relationships.  After 
all, wouldn’t the world be a much better place for everyone if we 
could just get along with our exes? 
 
 
Div. 1984). 
 162.  Id. at 114. 
 163.  See Wenzel v. Wenzel, 472 N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Suffolk 
Co. 1984). 
 164.  See Brancoveanu v. Brancoveanu, 535 N.Y.S.2d 86, 90 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1988).   
 165.  See Weilert v. Weilert, 562 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).  
“While the defendant herein may not have been a model husband or ideal 
father, this is not one of those rare cases where marital fault should have 
entered into the equitable distribution equation.”  Id. 
                                                                                                                                  
